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The AIIB is a controversial addition to Asian economic 
regionalism. It is the first multilateral development bank 
(MDB) dedicated to infrastructure, and the first international 
economic institution created by China. However, critics 
have alleged it is a vehicle for Chinese geostrategic goals, 
may dilute good governance initiatives, and compete with 
other MDBs working in Asia. During membership negotiations 
in 2015, China had to strike a balance between its own goals 
and its partners’ desire for a transparent and commercially-
oriented bank. To ensure the bank’s legitimacy, China 
has compromised with member states to create an 
institution which conforms to international best practices in 
development financing, and works with – rather than against 
– the existing MDBs to help close infrastructure gaps in Asia.
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• The establishment of the AIIB in 2016 was a landmark 
development in Asian economic regionalism. It is the world’s 
first multilateral development bank (MDB) dedicated to 
infrastructure, and the first international organisation created 
by China.
• It has also proved very controversial. Critics of the AIIB have 
alleged it is a vehicle for Chinese geostrategic agendas, may 
dilute good governance initiatives, and compete with other 
MDBs working in the region.
• In creating the AIIB, China has had to strike a balance between 
its own national economic goals and the desires of its partners for 
a transparent and commercially-oriented bank. 
• China’s AIIB strategy has changed over time. To ensure the 
bank's legitimacy, it has compromised with member states 
to create an institution which conforms to international best 
practices and cooperates with the existing MDBs.
• Thus far, there is little evidence that AIIB loans are being used to 
advance Chinese strategic agendas.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is 
a landmark development in Asian regionalism. 
Launched by the Chinese government in 2013, 
it is arguably the most significant economic 
institution to be established in the region for 
over a decade. The AIIB’s core mission is to help 
fill infrastructure gaps – the underdeveloped 
transport, energy and communication links 
which many agree are holding back Asia’s 
economic potential – by providing a new 
development bank specialising in infrastructure 
funding. It has already attracted wide support, 
counting seventy members from governments 
both within and without the region, who have 
contributed an initial capital stock of $100 
billion. It is also the first international organisation 
conceived, initiated and led by China, marking 
the country’s recent maturation to become a 
provider of regional public goods.
However, the establishment of the AIIB has not 
been without controversy. Critics have alleged it 
is not simply a provider of infrastructure finance, 
but a strategic vehicle to advance several 
of the Chinese government’s economic and 
strategic agendas. Others fear it will compete 
with the existing multilateral development banks 
such as the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and may undermine their efforts 
to promote good governance in development 
projects. While China and the AIIB leadership 
have strenuously rejected these claims, both the 
US and Japanese governments have declined 
membership invitations citing such governance 
concerns. As the AIIB begins to ramp up its 
lending activity in 2017, these controversies pose 
a significant question: What does China want 
from the AIIB?
In building this new international institution, 
China has needed to balance two competing 
imperatives. One on hand, as the AIIB’s leader 
and principal financier, Chinese policymakers 
expect the institution to help advance 
several strategic objectives – particularly its 
concomitant One Belt One Road regional 
connectivity project. On the other, the need 
to achieve legitimacy and a sense of ‘Asian’ 
rather than ‘Chinese’ ownership has meant 
that compromises with the interests, goals and 
agendas of other players has been required. 
As the initiative progressed, Chinese thinking on 
how this balance should be struck has evolved. 
An early emphasis on strategic goals has 
progressively given way to a focus on legitimacy 
objectives, resulting in an AIIB which is radically 
different from that which was initially proposed.
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CHINA’S FIRST FORAY INTO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION BUILDING
The proposal for the AIIB – and its rapid two-year progress from plan to reality – was decidedly 
China-led. The AIIB initiative was first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 20131 , 
in a speech to the Indonesian parliament during the first foreign tour of his Presidency. Following 12 
months of preliminary negotiations, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish the bank 
was signed by twenty-one Asian governments, and by March 2015 fifty-seven countries had signed 
onto the Chinese initiative. The AIIB’s legal foundation (the Articles of Agreement) entered into force 
in late 2015, and the bank began operations of 17 January 2016 with Jin Liqun elected as its inaugural 
President. Wasting little time, the AIIB quickly began financing activities, and has now approved 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the AIIB 
Per its Articles of Agreement2, the AIIB is 
a multilateral development bank (MDB) 
dedicated solely to financing infrastructure 
projects. Memberships is open to all current 
members of the World Bank and/or ADB, which 
are grouped into ‘regional’ and ‘non-regional’ 
blocs. It has a tripartite governance structure 
which is fundamentally similar to all other MDBs: 
featuring a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Directors and a Senior Management team3. 
The primary difference from other MDBs is its 
part-time and non-resident Board of Directors, 
designed to give the Senior Management team 
a greater degree of autonomy in operational 
decision-making4. The AIIB has an extensive 
range of policies5 which govern its funding 
activities, including Codes of Conduct for 
officials and personnel; procurement, financing, 
public information and loan pricing policies; 
and an Environmental and Social Framework for 
analysing the societal impact of its projects.
One unique features of the AIIB is its special 
status as an Asian institution. This is reflected 
in its bifurcated approach to membership. It 
defines its ‘regional’ members as those from the 
fifty-three United Nations Asia-Pacific Group of 
countries6, labelling all others as ‘non-regional’ 
members. Regional members must always retain 
at least 75 percent of the subscribed capital 
stock. As Board of Director votes on governance 
decisions require a 75 percent super-majority to 
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be carried, this membership system creates an asymmetry in veto powers: if Asian members vote 
as a bloc, they will always be able to carry a governance measure, whereas non-Asian members 
will be unable to exercise a veto. It also means that China – which holds 32.4 percent of the capital 
stock and 28.8 percent of the voting shares – currently enjoys an informal veto power over all 
governance matters.
Table 1: AIIB Capital subscription and voting shares, February 2017
Capital Subscriptions Voting Shares
USD millions Share
China 29780 33.41% 28.79%
India 8367 9.38% 8.31%
Russia 6536 7.33% 6.56%
Korea 3739 4.19% 3.88%
Australia 3691 4.14% 3.84%
Indonesia 3360 3.77% 3.52%
Other regional 14487 16.27% 21.84%
   Regional members 69960 78.49% 76.74%
Germany 4484 5.03% 4.59%
France 3375 3.78% 3.53%
United Kingdom 3054 3.42% 3.23%
Other non-regional 8255 9.27% 11.9%
   Non-regional members 19168 21.50% 23.25%
Source: AIIB (2016), ‘Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member Countries’, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/membership-
status/.content/index/_download/20160930035841674.pdf 
The AIIB has a three-fold significance for economic cooperation in Asia. First, it is experimental as 
the only MDB which is solely dedicated to infrastructure projects. By functionally specialising in a 
single area, it intends to concentrate expertise and knowledge to improve infrastructure lending 
practices7. Second, it promises to kick-start institution-building in Asia. It is the first economic body 
established in the region since the East Asia Summit of 2005; and the first financial organisation since 
the formation of the ADB in 1966. Third, it is the first time the Chinese government has proposed, led 
the negotiations for, and subsequently hosted the headquarters of an international organisation. 
The AIIB not only reflects a rapid and successful learning process for Chinese diplomats, but 
also marks China’s emergence as an institution-builder rather than just -follower in global 
economic governance8.
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WHY ANOTHER MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK?
Given China’s leadership of (and veto power 
within) the AIIB, there is considerable interest 
in its goals for the new bank. The global 
economy already has some twelve major 
MDBs9, all of which provide development 
finance for infrastructure projects. The Asia-
Pacific also has its own regional MDB – the Asian 
Development Bank – which since 2008 has 
actively targeted infrastructure in its financing 
programs10. Questions have therefore been 
raised over why the Chinese government 
has inserted yet another institution into the 
currently-crowded MDB landscape, rather 
than working through existing global and 
regional bodies? While China has emphasised 
infrastructure development and promoting 
regional interconnectivity as its principal aims, 
many commentators have alleged a range of 
more ‘strategic’ motives are at play. As a result, 
there is a heated debate over what precisely is 
China’s AIIB agenda.
The official answer – stressed by both AIIB11 and 
Chinese officials12 – is that the bank’s primary 
aim is to help close Asia’s ‘infrastructure gaps’. 
As a public good, infrastructure is frequently 
under-supplied, due to a lack of incentives 
facing private investors and coordination 
problems facing cross-border projects. The ADB 
has quantified the infrastructure investment 
needed in the region between 2010-20, 
estimating that $8 trillion is required for national 
projects and a further $290 billion for cross-
border linkages13. The Chinese government 
argues the AIIB can help close this gap by (1) 
earmarking $100 billion for infrastructure and 
(2) providing an MDB which specialises solely in 
infrastructure projects14. By marshalling capital 
and concentrating expertise, the AIIB could 
more efficiently support infrastructure projects 
than the other (non-specialised) MDBs.
However, critics have questioned whether 
the AIIB will indeed contribute to closing the 
regional infrastructure gap. Three criticisms are 
made. First, it is widely acknowledged the cause 
of under-investment is not a shortage of capital, 
but rather a lack of ‘bankable projects’ which 
MDBs could fund15. Second, many of the existing 
MDBs already have considerable expertise and 
capacity in infrastructure projects, particularly 
the ADB16. Third, it is feared that rather that 
creating technical capacity, the AIIB might 
simply cannibalise the infrastructure expertise 
of existing MDBs and compete for what few 
bankable projects are available17. The creation 
of a new Chinese-controlled MDB will thus 
only make a marginal impact on the region’s 
infrastructure deficit. These criticisms have led 
some to suggest the primary Chinese motive 
for creating the AIIB was instead one of several 
geostrategic objectives. 
One suggestion is that the AIIB is part of a 
revisionist push to reform global economic 
governance. China has for many years been 
frustrated by its lack of representation in 
international economic institutions, particularly 
the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank18. However, repeated attempts to 
increase the voice of developing economies 
such as China – particularly through voting 
system reforms – have been stymied by the US 
government keen on protecting its veto powers. 
By creating a new financial institution, in which 
Asian economies hold the majority of votes 
and China has an informal veto, the Chinese 
government is able to realise governance and 
leadership aspirations otherwise impossible 
within the existing global architecture19. 
President Jin Liqun has described the AIIB as a 
“progressive” institution, which will be led by 
developing countries and does not give veto 
powers to western country members20.
Another has been the allegation that the AIIB 
initiative is an attempt to export China’s excess 
industrial capacity. Since the fiscal stimulus 
following the global financial crisis, the Chinese 
economy has accumulated large industrial 
production overhangs, particularly in the steel, 
machinery and construction sectors. As much 
of this can be put to use in infrastructure, many 
analysts have noted that AIIB funded projects 
may help absorb China’s surplus industrial 
capacity21. Indeed, many Chinese officials have 
claimed that increased exports to regional 
partners was one of the major benefits the AIIB 
would carry for China22. These suggestions have 
raised concerns about the transparency of 
project governance, particularly the fear that 
China could use its large voting bloc to ensure 
construction contracts would be preferentially 
channelled to Chinese firms.
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It has also been suggested the AIIB is designed 
as vehicle for China to gain geopolitical 
influence with Asian countries. Some 
commentators have alleged China will use 
AIIB loans as a diplomatic side payment for 
friends23, which Reisen has labelled a form 
of “shadow global diplomacy”24. It has also 
been suggested it will preferentially direct 
finance to projects associated with China’s 
‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) strategy. Both 
Xi Jinping25 and the National Development 
and Reform Commission26 indicated that 
the AIIB was designed to support the OBOR 
program. This has led to concerns it will not 
finance the region’s most economically-justified 
infrastructure projects, but rather those which 
suit China’s geopolitical agendas, diluting the 
good governance practices promoted by the 
World Bank and ADB. Much of the opposition to 
the AIIB in western countries27, and the decision 
of the US and Japanese governments to 
decline membership invitations28, was based on 
these concerns.
What unites these differing criticisms is the 
suggestion that there is more to China’s AIIB 
agenda than simply closing infrastructure 
gaps in Asia. As the voting rules are explicitly 
designed to deny western countries veto 
powers, and informally give such powers 
to China, the fear is that the China will use 
bank loans to further its own economic and 
diplomatic ends. Rather than function as an 
‘Asian’ bank, cynics view the AIIB as a Chinese 
plaything to buy off regional governments and 
win business for Chinese firms. Chinese actors 
have frequently denied these allegations, with 
Jin Liqun bluntly arguing the “[the] AIIB is a 
bank, not a political organisation or political 
alliance”29. Despite this, the controversy over 
Chinese intentions have persisted , and are now 
the single greatest challenge to the perceived 
legitimacy of China’s first international 
economic organisation.
GROWING MEMBERSHIP AND 
EVOLVING AIIB GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS
Much of this legitimacy debate is premised on 
the notion that the AIIB is ‘owned by China’, 
and that China has a clear agenda to advance 
its own strategic goals. This assumption is 
problematic, because it ignores the fact that 
the AIIB is a multilateral institution controlled by 
all its members. While China proposed the AIIB 
and led the establishment process, complex 
negotiation with the other member states 
necessitated bargaining and compromise. To 
secure signatories and ensure the perceived 
legitimacy of the bank, Chinese diplomats had 
to strike a balance between their own strategic 
agendas and the interests and preferences 
of the other players. As a result, the AIIB 
changed quite dramatically between proposal 
and establishment.
The initial AIIB template, proposed by China 
during diplomatic negotiations in 2014, naturally 
reflected China’s own policy preferences. There 
was little emphasis on extra-regional members, 
with the focus instead on creating a bank 
compose primarily of Asian economies31. The 
Bank President was to have significantly more 
authority over operational decisions than in 
other MDBs, with a reduced role governance 
roles for the Directors and Governors32. There 
was little in the way of environmental, social 
or transparency safeguards33; and a clear 
preference to use Chinese construction 
contractors34. To help aid the internationalisation 
of the RMB, the AIIB was to issue at least some of 
its loans in RMB- rather than USD-denominated 
form35. Finally, China intended to contribute 50 
percent of the capital stock, and hold a formal 
veto power over all investment decisions36.
However, the involvement of several western 
economies changed the approach. China’s 
proposal was initially successful in attracting 
developing countries seeking infrastructure 
investment, and by the signing of the initial 
AIIB MoU in some twenty-one Asian economies 
had agreed to join. But as the March 2015 
membership deadline approached, several 
western countries – including Australia, Korea, 
and fourteen EU states – began actively 
negotiating membership. While supportive 
of a dedicated infrastructure bank, these 
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governments had governance concerns with the initial Chinese proposal. These included a 
desire to ensure the AIIB would be commercially-oriented, have rules-based lending practices, 
be transparent in its operations, and uphold existing best practices through environmental and 
social safeguards. Attracting these countries as members would greatly improve the perceived 
legitimacy and technical capacity of the AIIB, but would require compromise on many elements of 
China’s initial proposal.
Table 2: The AIIB’s evolving membership structure
AIIB MoU Signatories 
(October 2014)






Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, 
China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam
Australia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, New 
Zealand, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, UAE




Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom
Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Peru, Republic 
of Sudan, Venezuela
Note: As of February 2017, Brazil, Kuwait, Malaysia, South Africa and Spain are still completing ratification. 
The process for negotiating these compromises 
was complex, based on bilateral and plurilateral 
bargaining between the key players. However, 
when the final shape of the AIIB emerged by 
the end of 2015, it was clear that the western 
countries had a decisive impact on governance 
arrangements. The key compromises included 
the following:
• Non-regional members: The AIIB would 
ultimately include 29 members from outside 
the region, which received three of the 
twelve Board of Governors positions 
• Commercial behaviour: The AIIB would only 
issue USD-denominated loans, which were 
to be made at commercial rather than 
concessional rates37.
• International best practices: The AIIB 
developed a formal set of transparency and 
social safeguard policies38; and adopted an 
open and competitive procurement policy39 
which emphasised efficiency, value-for-
money and transparency.
• Voting structure: China relinquished its claim 
to a formal veto power; and reduced its 
shareholding to 28.9 percent.
These governance compromises fundamentally 
altered the character of the AIIB. Far from 
being a China-controlled institution, it is now a 
broad-based MDB which draws members from 
a diverse range of countries within and without 
the region. It adopted governance practices 
and policies fundamentally like the other 
MDBs, emphasising transparency, competitive 
tendering and commercial loan activities. While 
China retains an informal veto40, representative 
Boards of Governors and Directors ensure 
a wide range of voices will shape decision-
making. These limit the ability of China to 
manipulate AIIB loan activities to advance its 
own strategic agendas. They have also gone a 
long way to assuaging many of the governance 
criticisms which were initially levelled at 
the bank.
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WORKING WITH THE EXISTING DEVELOPMENT BANKS
Another common criticism of the AIIB was that it 
was little more than a China-backed competitor 
to the existing MDBs. Noting that many other 
MDBs already have expertise and established 
programs for infrastructure financing, critics have 
suggested the AIIB will duplicate the function 
of already-existing bodies, particularly the 
ADB and World Bank41. There are also fears the 
AIIB will compete with these banks for the few 
‘investment-ready’ projects in the region, simply 
redistributing financing options rather than 
creating new infrastructure42. As The Economist 
has argued, if China genuinely wanted to 
close regional infrastructure gaps it might have 
just offered resources to the ADB’s existing 
infrastructure programs, instead of the laborious 
task of creating a new MDB from scratch43.
To allay these fears of competition, the AIIB has 
worked hard to build cooperative relations with 
the other MDBs. In a speech to the Asia Society 
Policy Institute in early 2016, Jin Liqun declared 
the AIIB would actively work in partnership with 
other MDBs by adopting a joint-venture strategy 
for project financing44. The AIIB moved quickly 
to sign cooperation agreements in its first year 
of operations. The first was an agreement with 
the World Bank in April 2016, where the two 
institutions agreed to co-finance projects under 
the supervision of World Bank policies. Similar 
MoUs were signed with the ADB, European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
in May45. Building on the expertise of these 
institutions, many of the AIIB’s initial staff were 
drawn from the World Bank and ADB46. 
Indeed, the AIIB has largely worked with – and 
in many cases for – the other MDBs. During 
its first year of operation, the AIIB financed 
twelve infrastructure projects in its regional 
member economies (Table 3). Of these, only 
three relatively small projects were AIIB-led. In 
most cases the AIIB simply joined an existing 
project of the ADB, EBRD or World Bank as a 
minority financing partner. These were initiative 
and managed by the other MDBs, whose 
status as lead lender saw their governance 
and procurement policies applied. Even the 
AIIB’s financial contribution was modest, which 
provided only 15 percent of the total cost 
of the projects. Thus far, the AIIB has largely 
loaned under policy the supervision of more 
established MDBs.
Table 3: AIIB funded projects, April 2016
Funding 
Date









Jun 2016 Bangladesh Power distribution system upgrading AIIB Yes 262 165
Jun 2016 Indonesia Slum upgrading project WB No 1743 216.5
Jun 2016 Pakistan Shorkot-Khanewal M-4 Motorway 
upgrade
ADB No 273 100
Jun 2016 Tajikistan Dushanbe-Uzbekistan road 
improvement
EBRD No 106 27.5
Sep 2016 Pakistan Tarbela-5 Hydropower extension WB No 823 300
Sep 2016 Myanmar Myingyan CCGT power plant IFC, ADB No 137 20
Dec 2016 Oman Railway system preparation planning AIIB Yes 60 36
Dec 2016 Oman Duqm Port commercial terminal AIIB Yes 353 265
Dec 2016 Azerbaijan TANAP Pipeline WB No 8600 600
Mar 2017 Indonesia Dam Operational Improvement and 
Safety
WB No 300 125
Mar 2017 Indonesia Regional Infrastructure Development 
Fund
WB No 406 100
March 2017 Bangladesh Natural Gas Infrastructure upgrade ADB No 453 60
Total 13516 2015
Source: AIIB (2017), ‘Approved Projects’, https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html 
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There is little evidence of Chinese ‘strategic’ 
behaviour in these early loan activities. In the 
main, the AIIB has simply piggy-backed on the 
work of others rather than developing its own 
projects. None are explicitly connected to the 
Chinese OBOR program, preferentially give 
contracts to Chinese suppliers, nor undermine or 
dilute the existing good governance practices. 
Indeed, while the AIIB relies on other MDBs for a 
supply of loan-ready projects, it has no capacity 
to be used as a tool for Chinese diplomatic 
manoeuvring. In part, this stems from the fact 
the AIIB is currently in a start-up phase; and 
as it builds capacity in coming years will likely 
begin to develop its own independent projects. 
But thus far, the AIIB has done little more than 
channel a small amount of additional capital 
into existing infrastructure financing mechanisms.
REVISING OR REINFORCING 
THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
ARCHITECTURE?
The AIIB which has emerged is a far cry from 
a strategic Chinese attempt to redraw the 
regional economic architecture. Rather, it 
closely conforms to existing practices. The AIIB is 
a broad-based multilateral institution, which has 
borrowed international governance practices 
and adopted a commercially-oriented 
approach to infrastructure financing. It has 
established cooperative rather than competitive 
relations with its peer MDBs, and currently relies 
on them to supply bankable projects. While 
China holds the largest voting share it does 
not control the bank, and its governance 
arrangements allow little scope for China to 
manipulate funding for strategic ends. Thus far, 
its principal impact has been to establish the 
world’s first specialist infrastructure bank, and 
make a modest though much-needed addition 
to the regional pool of infrastructure financing.
It is also clear that China’s AIIB strategy 
changed over time. The initial proposal looked 
very different, promising an institution under 
Chinese control and designed to advance 
its own economic and diplomatic agendas. 
But as a wider range of developed countries 
joined the negotiations in early 2015, external 
pressure was brought to bear on the design 
of governance arrangements. The Chinese 
government faced a choice: to persist with 
the initial model favouring its strategic interests 
at the cost of facing stiff foreign opposition, 
or adopt more transparent and commercial 
governance practices which would ensure it 
gained international legitimacy. In a welcome 
act of ‘responsible leadership’ the Chinese 
architects of the AIIB chose the latter. 
Of course, it is still early days. The AIIB has so 
far issued $2 billion of loans, only a tiny fraction 
of its $100 billion subscribed capital. As it 
accumulates technical capacity and funding 
experience in coming years, it will surely begin 
financing infrastructure projects of its own. 
This will prove the test of the quality of the 
AIIB governance rules, and China's longer-
term intentions for the bank. In the absence 
of the influence of MDB partners, will the AIIB 
continue its commitment to a transparent 
and commercial approach to infrastructure 
financing? And will China use its large 
shareholding, informal veto power and control 
of the bank presidency to revise its behaviour 
in years to come? Only time will tell. But the 
early indicators all suggest that China wants 
to contribute a transparent and legitimate 
institution to the Asian economic architecture. 
Given recent headwinds facing the region, this 
is a welcome development.
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